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SPECIAL FEATURES
THE TREND OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN
INDIAN CASES*
Louis F. Claiborne**
For the last several decades, Indian cases in the Supreme Court of the
United States have enjoyed a very low profile. That may not be flattering to
the tribes or to the advocates who argue Indian cases. But, on the whole,
Indians have benefitted from the general disinterest in their cases. This is so
for two related reasons.
(a) Within the Court itself, most Justices have shown very little interest. For
many years, the assignment of the Court's opinion in Indian cases fell to Hugo
Black or William Douglas, both sympathetic to the Indian cause. Putting aside
monetary claims against the United States in respect to old wrongs (which have
always divided the Court), it is significant how many unanimous landmark
decisions were written by Justice Black. Most of them favored the Indians. I
need only mention Tulee, Williams v. Lee,2 Seymour,3 Warren Trading Post,4
and Arizona v. California! For Justice Douglas (whose bias in favor of
Indians was tempered by his conservationist instincts), I can cite Santa Fe, and
the first two Puyallup7 decisions.
*This speech is the first of three speeches, each delivered separately, at three Federal Bar
Association Indian Law Conferences in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The speeches were delivered
by Louis F. Claibome, Reid Peyton Chambers, and Douglas B.L. Endreson in 1980, 1991, and
1997, respectively. All three speeches are reprinted in this section as part of the American Indian
Law Review's Silver Anniversary Celebration: Looking Back at 25 Years of Indian Law: Where
Are We and Where Are We Going? All three speeches have been previously published by the
Federal Bar Association in their Indian law conference materials and are published here with the
permission of the Federal Bar Association. For more information on the Annual Indian Law
Conferences hosted by the Indian law section of the Federal Bar Association, please contact the
FBA at (202) 638-0252.
**LL.B., Tulane University; Barrister (Middle Temple). At the time, the author was Deputy
Solicitor General of the United States. He is now Of Counsel to the California firm of Washburn,
Briscoe, and McCarthy. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily represent
the official position of the United States.
I. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
2. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
3. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
4. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
5. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
6. United States ex reL Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
7. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1962); Department of Game v.
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It is remarkable that those opinions, none of them inexorable in their result
of their reasoning, and some of them quite startling in their implications, stirred
no dissent. In almost any other area of the law, one or more Members of the
Court would surely have dissented or concurred on more limited grounds. It
seems obvious that the other Justices, in these cases, were not so acutely
interested, and therefore, did not so critically examine the portent of the
decisions. There are, of course, exceptions. I well remember having to twice
argue Menominee' and Choctaw Nation,9 both of which severely divided the
Court, with Black and Douglas on opposite sides. But the general rule in the
1950s and 1960s was that decisions in Indian cases (except monetary claims)
were unanimous.
To a lesser degree, the same pattern has continued in more recent times.
Considering the force of the arguments on the other side (available, if not
always forcibly made), and the increasing tendency of Justices to write separate
opinions, it is quite extraordinary how many cases in the 1970s were
unanimous. Let me suggest as examples of cases that, in another context,
predictably would have stirred a dissent, McClanahan,"0 Mattz v. Arnett,"
Oneida,"z Mancari, 3 Mazurie," Fisher,5 Bryan, 6 Wheeler,7 and John.8
Who can doubt that the relatively low priority of Indian cases in the Supreme
Court accounts, in some part at least, for the number of these decisions, issued
unchallenged by any Member of the Court?
I recognize that the same lack of critical examination may be responsible for
unanimous decisions in the opposite direction. One early example is New York
ex rel. Ray v. Martin,19 in which Justice Black, for a unanimous Court, re-
affirmed the very troublesome McBratney doctrine, holding that a crime by
a white man against another white man on an Indian Reservation was the
exclusive concern of State authorities, notwithstanding the apparently contrary
rule announced by section 1152 of the Criminal Code. A more recent instance
is Moe,2' in which the entire Court joined Justice Rehnquist in condoning a
requirement that Indian sellers of cigarettes pre-collect the State tax from their
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
8. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
9. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
10. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
11. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
12. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
13. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
14. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
15. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
16. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
17. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
18. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
19. New York ex reL Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
20. United States v. McBratney, 108 U.S. 621 (1881).
21. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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non-Indian purchasers on a Reservation. But, all things considered, the Tribes
have benefitted from the Court's somewhat careless approach to Indian cases.
(b) Equally important is the attitude of the general public and the national
press toward Indian cases. To whatever extent the Court might be influenced
by prevailing currents of opinion in its other cases, that is not a factor in most
Indian cases. Nor is there here any real risk that the Court's decision will be
overturned by Congress. The reason is that, except in the affected State and
among a select band of lawyers, the non-Indian world simply does not notice
decisions affecting Indian rights. The only recent show of interest by the
general public and the press was when the Indian Tribes of Maine laid claim
to a substantial part of that State. But, fortunately, that case did not reach the
Supreme Court and is not likely to do so. To my knowledge, no Indian
decision of the Court in several decades has received national attention.
This is all to the good. No doubt, most Americans are aware that the
National Government, and some State Governments as well, have, over two
centuries, killed and starved and robbed and cheated the Indian. They know,
moreover, that, for long periods, it was governmental policy to destroy the
Tribe's identify and culture. When, on rare occasions, they are led to think
about it, white Americans feel guilty about the past, and they sympathize. Most
of them probably would not begrudge the money awards made by the Court
of Claims and the Indian Claims Commission. But, that, I suspect, is as far as
it goes. Indeed, for one untutored in Indian law, the major decisions of the
Supreme Court would seem very questionable, if not downright "un-American."
- Why should Indians enjoy special preferences in jobs and government
contracts?
- Why should Indian property and Indian Reservation income be uniquely
exempted from State and local taxes, even when the Indians receive some
services paid for by those taxes? (Justice Stevens, not hostile to the Indian
cause, asked that question in Court a few months ago).
- Why should Indians who pay no State and local taxes be entitled to vote
in State and local elections?
- Why should tribal governments have power to regulate and tax non-
Indians on a Reservation who are ineligible to sit on the tribal council or to
participate in the election of council members?
- Why should Indians alone be free to hunt and fish free of most
restrictions, except those of their own choosing?
- Why should relatively few Indians in the State of Washington be assured
the right to catch half the salmon, while other fishermen are compelled to share
the other half?
- Why should Indians have the unique right to preempt scarce water which,
for the most part, they do not even use today?
These, and like questions, challenge very fundamental principles, embodied
in mottos that every schoolboy learns: "No taxation without representation,"
"government is color blind," "equality under the law," "one man, one vote." Of
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course, there are special reasons for these exceptional rules. But I should not
like the Court (or the Congress) to be bound by the answers a Gallup poll
would give to these questions.
(c) I do not want to suggest that the Supreme Court would buckle before
popular outrage, if it were vocalized. The Court has proved its courage in this
respect often enough. But, on the other hand, the Court cannot always ignore
the mood of the country. And I am not sure that on the very debatable
questions of Indian law the Court would be wholly insensitive to a very general
reaction to the effect that "enough is enough." Besides, some of the Justices
probably have nagging doubts concerning even the established rules favoring
Indians. A national debate might bring those doubts to the fore. And finally,
whatever the Court does, the Congress - whose power in this matter is almost
without limit - must head the public clamor.
I say only that the low visibility of Indian cases is a blessing not lightly to
be thrown away. In my view, it is very dangerous to press on the Court
propositions that are bound to stir hostile instincts in the general public and
may produce a like reaction from a majority of the Justices.
We have one example in Oliphant.' The United States supported the
Suquamish Tribe in that case. But to no avail. The Court could not condone
a tribal claim to impose criminal penalties on Reservation residents who had
no voice in writing the laws under which they would be tried and whose race
was excluded from the jury that would determine their guilt. When, in the
Government's brief, I suggested that there was nothing unusual in a foreigner
being subjected to the laws of Rome when living in Rome (or words to like
effect), the Attorney General of the State of Washington reacted much like
Governor Lumpkin of Georgia 150 years ago, who was outraged at the
"impudence" of summoning his State before the Supreme Court at the suit of
the Cherokee Nation,a which he described as "a few savages residing within
the territory of Georgia." Had the Court ruled with the Tribe, there might well
have resulted a more general "hue and cry" that would have found audience in
the Halls of Congress. At all events, the Court itself drew the line, viewing the
claim as beyond the pale.
So, also, I would expect the Court, if put to the test, to reject other extreme
claims. To give only one example, I cannot suppose the Court will condone
a tribal regulation that purports to reserve to members alone, to' the exclusion
of other permanent residents of the Reservation, the right to hunt and fish
there. And the same applies to any other blatantly discriminatory tribal
regulation or tax measure. As it happens, the Crowe case, just taken by the
Court, will probably resolve that question soon enough.
(d) I have suggested that stirring a public backlash may encourage the
22. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
23. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).




Supreme Court to call a sharp halt to the recognition of Indian rights, and may
even persuade it to retreat somewhat. It might be, though, that it is too late to
worry about that. It is certainly true that, increasingly, more Members of the
Court are individually looking at Indian cases, witness the greater number of
divided decisions. I need only cite DeCoteau,5 Rosebud,' Oliphant, the
Yakima p.L 280 Case," and the Washington Fishery CaseU The Court is
no longer docilely following the strong lead of a Hugo Black or a Bill Douglas.
But, in my view, that makes it all the more important not to ask too much of
the Court. Justices, still willing to follow faithfully, without re-examination,
older decisions favoring the Tribes, may be pushed into reconsidering those
precedents if they are pressed too far. We prevailed in the Washington Fishery
Case, but not by much. I suspect all it would have taken to lose that case was
to ridicule the 50 percent formula and insist that the Tribes enjoyed an
unlimited and open-ended right to catch all the fish they could, leaving only
what was left to other fishermen. Wisely, the Tribes did not press that
argument and the United States stopped at a 50 percent maximum.
II
I have said more than enough about not "rocking the boat" and stirring a
backlash. The Court is not as fragile as all that. There are, I believe, some
directions now fixed that nothing will change. And there are issues that
inevitably will reach the Court, regardless how strongly we, or the Justices
themselves, might wish to leave well enough alone. Moreover, the status quo
is unsatisfactory, and risk or not, we must press for something more.
I begin with what seems secure. These are trends which I believe the Court
will not reverse, short of clear action by Congress.
(a) Except as Congress has expressly provided otherwise, the Court will
continue, I am confident, to allow full sway to tribal authority over members,
whether that involves the exercise of criminal or civil or taxing jurisdiction, or
family matters, or questions or membership. This is sufficiently indicated by
such cases as Fisher, Wheeler, and Martinez." Although strong cases under
the Indian Civil Rights Act will no doubt be presented to challenge the
Martinez ruling - to the effect that, except for habeas corpus, that statute is
not enforceable in federal court - my betting is that the Court will stand firm.
I suggest that, when only Indians are involved, the Court will rebuff State
interference and will also tend to read much more restrictively federal laws that
25. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
26. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
27. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463
(1979).
28. Washington v. Washington State Comm. Pass. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
29. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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have been assumed to require federal dictation or approval of tribal actions.
To this extent, I believe the court is committed to the idea of tribal self-
government and to encouraging the development of independent tribal
institutions. My fear is that a majority of the Court will view this as full
satisfaction of the residual sovereignty of Indian tribes and their right of self-
government. Wheeler can be so read.
(b) I think it also clear that the Court will fully preserve the State tax
immunity of Reservation Indians and Indian property, real and personal, within
Reservations, as well as existing exemptions for restricted Indian land outside
Reservations. McClanahan, Mescalero", Moe, and Bryan, firmly settle those
matters, however questionable the articulated rationale of those cases.
(c) Nor do I believe the Court will go back on its decisions recognizing
treaty secured tribal hunting and fishing rights, both on and off Reservation.
The Puyallup cases, Antoine"' and the Washington Fishery Case, will survive.
But we must appreciate the limited scope of those decisions. None of them
remotely suggests that a Tribe "owns" the game or fish involved, or says
anything about tribal regulation of non-Indian hunting or fishing within a
Reservation, much less condones discrimination against non-Indian permanent
residents. Additionally, with respect to migrating fish or game which are not
confined within the Reservation, it is clear that tribal members cannot help
themselves without limit. Indeed, the Washington Fishery Case reaffirms the
holding of Payallup 1IP that necessary State conservation regulations apply to
migrating fish within a Reservation. It may be that the actual exercise of State
jurisdiction can be avoided by adequate tribal regulation. But that is not clear.
Off-reservation rights are, of course, subject to stricter limitations and, at least
potentially, to necessary State conservation jurisdiction.
One other comment about off-reservation rights is called for. Some believe
the Menominee decision - a precarious precedent at best - can be extended
so as to preserve hunting and fishing rights in ceded lands, even though the
treaty or agreement or statute says nothing about it. Some lower courts may
accept that proposition. But, in my view, the Supreme Court will not - at
least as to areas not held by Indians. The tendency is to confine special Indian
immunities and prerogatives to "Indian country," and perhaps to the
Reservation, except where explicit provisions of treaty or statute require going
further. 'Indeed, this is, in my view, a promising development: the more
geographically restricted they are, and the more clearly defined the boundaries,
the easier it is to concede special rights and governmental powers to the Tribes.
(d) Although the Court has had no recent occasion to speak to the question,
I do not doubt that it will fully respect tribal control of its land and natural
resources. Here I mean only Indian-owned, and primarily tribally owned, land
30. Mescnlero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
31. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).




and resources within a Reservation. I believe the Court will rebuff any State
attempt to interfere with tribal decisions about land use, or water use, or
development or non-development of mineral deposits or timber, except only as
it is demonstrably necessary to protect non-Indian neighbors from harm or
serious nuisance. Of course, the State can enjoin activities within an Indian
Reservation that threaten others of its citizens in the same way that it could
prevent such activities in a neighboring State. That includes polluting the air
or water, excessive diversions from a stream, and, as the Court's recent action
in Idaho v. Oregon & Washington33 indicates, taking too many migrating fish.
How much further, if at all, the Court will condone State intervention, is not
clear. But I would expect the Court to hold that at least tribally held
Reservation land is immune from general State zoning regulation and that the
exploitation of tribally owned resources requires no permission from State
authorities.
(e) Another noticeable trend in the Court's recent decisions is to prefer the
claims of the Tribe over those of individual members. Jim gave some
indication in that direction and Hollowbreast5 confirmed it. Martinez points
the same way, and so does the Washington Fishery Case by stressing the tribal
nature of the fishing rights there involved.
(f) Finally, the Court has indicated some concern about the heavy, and often
clumsy, hand of federal officials in tribal affairs. A sufficient example is
Tooahnippah,5 in which the Court found wholly unwarranted the Interior
Department's substitution of its views for the will of the testator as to who
should inherit an Indian allotment. I perceive a disposition on the Court's part
to open to judicial challenge what were once deemed unreviewable decisions
of federal officials in respect of Indian property. Arbitrary, or even grossly
negligent, federal actions will no longer be immunized.
As I have already said, I believe the Court will be receptive to the
suggestion that existing federal statutes do not, in fact, vest in the Interior
Department the degree of supervisory control over tribal affairs that has been
assumed. Indeed, that Department, in many instances, has been asked to
approve tribal actions which it claims no power to control. But it must be
noted that the Court is much more likely to correct present errors and
unauthorized interference than it is to investigate past wrongs and permit
monetary recoveries outside the Indian Claims Commission Act. Mason37 and
Mitchell," and the result I expect in the Sioux Nation39 case, make that clear.
33. Idaho v. Oregon & Washington, 444 U.S. 390 (1980).
34. United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80 (1972).
35. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976).
36. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970).
37. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973).
38. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
39. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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Although the Court has thus far avoided doing so, I think it fair to say that
it has thrown out a warning that even Congress' power to manage tribal
property and tribal affairs is not as "plenary" as was once believed. I do not
read as much into the Weeks decision as some do. But it does reject the old
notion (never fully endorsed by the Court anyway) that congressional decisions
affecting Indians are beyond scrutiny by the courts. I do not expect the Court
to re-open the question whether Congress can abrogate an Indian treaty or
whether Congress can authorize the taking of recognized Indian land upon
payment of just compensation. Nor - although the arguments are much
stronger -- do I suppose the Court will entertain any challenge to the
constitutionality of Public Law 280 before tribal consent was required, or to the
Termination Acts -of the 1950s, much less the earlier Allotment Acts. Yet,
there is reason to expect the Court to look more closely at any future federal
legislation that is blatantly discriminatory - as between Indians themselves or
as between Indians and non-Indians - or that adversely affects Indian property
or rights without a rational basis in "the unique obligation [of the United
States] toward the Indians." Whatever the actual result of the case, we may
soon learn more about the Court's thinking on this score when it decides Sioux
Nation.
IV
There remains the critical question of jurisdiction over non-Indians within
a Reservation, both those who own land and live there as permanent residents
and those who come into the Reservation to engage in business activities or
commercial transactions with the Tribe or its members. In these matters, the
present Court has not recently spoken, although it cannot be too much longer
before the decisions in Colville,41 White Mountain Apache42, and Central
Machinery,,3 will reveal its thinking. The imminence of those decisions makes
it very rash to predict anything, but we can at least explore the possible
approaches.
(a) I begin with the situation common to all reservations: non-Indian
business invitees on the Reservation. I mean to include those who sell to
Tribes or members, those who buy from them, those who perform services on
the Reservation for the Tribe (whether it be construction work, or logging, or
mineral extraction, or anything else), and also those who come to fish or hunt
or ski or drink or enjoy other recreational activities offered by the Indians for
a price.
The firit question is whether the Tribe can regulate and tax such activities
40. Delware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
41. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
42. White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).




by non-Indians within the Reservation. Venerable precedents suggest an
affirmative answer and I would expect the Court to adhere to them. The old
rationale was simply that, since the tribe could exclude non-members
altogether, it must be free to impose conditions on their admission. I think that
still holds good for areas remaining in Indian ownership within a Reservation.
The decision in Williams v. Lee points in that direction. The result may be
very different, of course, in respect of fee owners whose ancestors were invited
by Congress a century ago, without any express condition of submitting to
tribal authority.
The other question as to what I have labelled "business invitees" is whether
the State can also regulate and tax their on-Reservation activities. That is the
question directly involved in the three cases now awaiting decision. The
answer is very much in doubt. But I will rashly predict that the Court will
invoke Warren Trading Post to hold that State regulation and taxation is
preempted, at least when the Reservation situs of the activity or transaction is
not wholly artificial or fortuitous. Thus, I am optimistic about White Mountain
Apache, less so about Central Machinery and Colville, especially in light of
Moe. But I do not despair that the Court will recognize an immunity from
State taxes even in the last two cases in deference to the congressional policy
of furthering tribal self-sufficiency, which in many cases depends upon
insulating non-Indians from State taxes in respect of their dealings with a
Tribe.
(b) The same two questions - can the Tribe regulate and tax? Can the State
do so? - arise in connection with non-Indian permanent residents who own
land within a Reservation. But the problems are very different. I am now
speaking of the activities of non-Indians within a Reservation which do not
directly involve Indians, but which, in one degree or another, affect the Indian
community. I put to one side crimes and torts in which no Indian is involved.
The McBratney line of cases - recently re-affirmed in AntelopeO - tells us
that the State will enjoy criminal jurisdiction when offender and victim are
both non-Indian. I assume State courts will likewise deal with purely non-
Indian civil disputes. The Supreme Court, I think, is almost certain to leave
these arrangements alone. But there remains the whole area of "regulatory
law."
The tribal claim to regulate the activities of non-Indian owners within a
Reservation, especially in a "checkerboard" situation, is fairly strong, because
those activities immediately affect the Indian community. Thus, reasonable and
non-discriminatory zoning regulation, hunting and fishing restrictions, pollution
controls, and water use rules, can be justified. The Supreme Court has not
directly spoken and the first case to present some aspect of the question may
be the Crow case. Oliphant is not a good omen, and it inhibits enforcement by
44. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
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criminal penalties. But I do not despair. At all events, I would have no
reluctance in pressing reasonable and non-discriminatory claims of this sort,
especially if it can be shown that tribal regulation is essential to protect the
Indian community. If such claims prevail, it does not immediately follow that
State regulation is preempted. But, assuming it takes the first big step, I
believe the Court probably will be persuaded that the need for a single uniform
system justifies the second step as well.
The issue of taxation, as to non-Indian permanent residents, is quite
separate. Here, the State claim is well-established in Supreme Court decisions
and there is no real prospect of reversing the rules. Nor do I hold much hope
for any tribal claim (and I know of none) to tax non-Indian land or the
Reservation income of non-Indian permanent residents - unless, perhaps, if
the tax is directly related to services provided to them by the Tribe. There is,
under present conditions, no point in pursuing this idea.
V
The answer to these questions about tribal and State authority over activities
by non-Indians within a Reservation depends, in part, on where one begins.
For some years, most Indian cases involving assertions of State jurisdiction
within a Reservation have been resolved by asking two questions: (1) Is the
exercise of State authority preempted by relevant provisions of federal treaties
or statutes? and (2) In any event, does the State's action infringe upon the
Indians' right of self-government? This approach has worked well enough so
far. But it cannot serve much further. Unless a firmer basis for the special
Indian immunities and prerogatives is substituted, I fear the edifice will crack,
if it does not altogether crumble.
(a) The Court has stretched provisions of treaties and statutes to the
breaking point to find federal pre-emption of State intervention. Even with
respect to State taxation of Reservation Indians, it is very difficult to point to
any provision of federal law that does more than exempt tribal land. And,
certainly, we can find nothing expressly foreclosing State regulation or taxation
of non-Indians on a Reservation, even when their activities immediately affect
the Indian community. I suspect that this statutory pre-emption approach will
yield nothing more. To press it any further would expose the pretense too
starkly.
The so-called "infringement" test is equally vulnerable. The very term "self-
government" suggests tribal authority only over members. Indeed, there is
language in Wheeler suggesting as much. So understood, it is very difficult to
argue that regulating or taxing non-Indians who are merely buying from or
selling to Indians is an aspect of self-government, or that State regulation and
taxation of such non-Indian activities infringes "the right of the Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." It is even more difficult to rely on the
right of self-government to explain tribal regulation of land use by non-Indian




(b) The limitations and weaknesses of the traditional "pre-emption" and
"infringement" tests, have led me back to the old idea of residual tribal
sovereignty. The obvious advantages of this approach are: (1) that, as Wheeler
stressed, to determine what powers remain, one does not look to see what
Congress granted, but simply what has been taken, all else surviving; (2) that
"sovereignty," as opposed to self-government, necessarily implies some
authority over a territory; and (3), that the same principle usually - although
not always - decides both whether tribal authority exists and whether State
authority is precluded.
Until very recently, there were serious obstacles to headlining the term
"Indian sovereignty." First, to speak of "sovereign Tribes" within States was
undiplomatic, to put it mildly. Second, "sovereign" seemed an ill-fitting word
to describe wholly dependent collections of Indians, sometimes of unrelated
Tribes, merely subsisting on government "hand-outs" on arbitrarily assigned
reservations, often with no governmental structure of their own. Third, to claim
tribal sovereignty appeared to be inconsistent with the State jurisdiction within
Reservations that had to be conceded (e.g., the McBratney rule and the
taxability of non-Indian land), not to mention the "plenary" power of Congress.
And, finally, in McClanahan, if not earlier, the Court had relegated the Indian
sovereignty doctrine to the role of a mere "backdrop." I may add that talk of
"sovereignty" tends to create unreal expectations in the Indian community.
All these problems still exist. But the significant rebirth of tribal institutions
makes the claim of sovereignty more persuasive. And, equally important, the
Supreme Court's eloquent exposition of the doctrine in Wheeler, together with
the re-affirmation of tribal sovereign immunity from suit in Puyallup III and
Martinez, authorizes us to speak of sovereignty once more without committing
lse-majestJ. Accordingly, in the Government's brief in Colville, I outlined a
claim to presumptive tribal territorial jurisdiction over all activities occurring
within a Reservation. But I also made the more traditional modem arguments.
We must wait to see the Court's reaction.
(c) Assuming the Court does not, once again, bury the Indian sovereignty
doctrine beyond revival, it becomes important to define the scope of tribal
sovereignty. There is nothing to be gained by harking back to colonial days
when the Six Nations Confederacy, for instance, was a fully independent
foreign power. And, on the other hand, we must define sovereignty in a way
that justifies invoking that term, rather than a lesser word more appropriate to
describe a private club. This is not the time or place to attempt a full
definition. A few generalities must suffice.
Indian Tribes are, of course, "domestic" sovereignties. In this respect, they
are deemed to have surrendered (willingly or not) to the United States much
the same powers the States surrendered by forming the "more perfect Union."
But there are, of course, important differences. Tribes, unlike States, are not
directly constrained by the Bill of Rights or the Reconstruction Amendments.
On the other hand, they are not protected by the Tenth Amendment and
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congressional power over them is almost unlimited. What is more, even
without legislation, Tribes, because of their "dependent status" vis-h-vis the
United States, are deemed to have relinquished the right to alienate their land
except to the United States or with its approval, and also the right to punish
non-members. In sum, tribal sovereignty is a precarious thing subject to
diminution, even perhaps destruction, at the will of Congress.
Anything so vulnerable may not sound like a "sovereign," or even a "semi-
sovereign," entity. Indeed, if the Court in Wheeler had not repeatedly used the
word, I would be tempted to substitute the concept of "separateness." But in
fact, history and political theory tell us that there is nothing incongruous in the
notion of a quasi-sovereign sub-nation, retaining its limited independence only
so long as, and to the extent that, the suzerain wills it. At all events, Indian
Tribes today are sovereign primarily - perhaps only - vis-A-vis the States,
not the United States. It may seem more difficult to explain why, absent
express permission from the suzerain (the United States), State jurisdiction
should cross Reservation boundaries at all, if Tribes are sovereigns of their
territory. The answer must be that the State's right to punish or tax its non-
Indian citizens, in respect of acts done in Indian country, is akin to the right
asserted by some nations, including ours, to hold its citizens accountable for
acts committed, or income earned, abroad. But, in principle, the State ought
have no power to carry out enforcement of its laws within the boundaries of
a Reservation, nor to pre-empt tribal regulation. That would be inconsistent
with the territorial sovereignty of the Tribe. In this respect, the last holding of
Moe is a blow to the sovereignty doctrine. Perhaps it can be overturned.
(d) What I have just said indicates that recognition of tribal territorial
sovereignty does not necessarily preclude the State from taxing or otherwise
controlling the activities of its non-Indian citizens in Indian country, provided
it does not "invade" the Reservation to secure compliance. The sovereignty of
the United Kingdom did not prevent the United States from taxing my income
as an English barrister, however "essential" my services were to the British
public and no matter that the economic burden of the tax might fall on my
English client. If State taxation of non-Indians in respect of their dealings with
Indians within a Reservation is barred, it must be on some basis other than
tribal sovereignty. Here, we must rely on some doctrine of pre-emption by the
"supreme law" of the United States.
VI
There is, of course, no mystery about the origins of Indian sovereignty: it
is aboriginal. The critical question is: What body of law shields the residual
sovereignty of tribes against State interference or destruction? And, also, what
body of law precludes the State from regulating or taxing at least some non-
Indian activities within a Reservation that the territorial sovereignty of the
Tribe alone would not prevent? The usual answer these days is: "particular




in most cases, and especially so in respect of Reservations established by Act
of Congress or Presidential Order after the end of the treaty period. I feel
much more secure with a constitutional basis, and I believe such a basis exists.
I have very tentatively sketched out one aspect of it in our amicus brief in
Central Machinery and the Court has not yet laughed it down. Time will tell.
The bare bones are these.
(a) The Constitution expressly recognizes the separateness of Indian Tribes,
as quasi-sovereign political entities. As Chief Justice Marshall noted long ago,
the Supremacy Clause impliedly recognizes Indian Tribes as distinct political
communities by effectively ratifying and continuing in force "treaties heretofore
made," almost all which, in 1789, were Indian treaties, and by suggesting
further that such treaties would be appropriate. So, also, the Commerce Clause,
in speaking of "commerce with the Indian tribes" as something different from
"commerce between the States," necessarily separates the Indian Tribes from
the States. And, finally, the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from the
population on the basis of which a State's Representatives are apportioned,
makes it clear that Indians maintaining tribal relations, even though within the
boundaries of a State, are separate and exempt from State jurisdiction.
Significantly, this provision was repeated in the Fourteenth Amendment,
ratified in 1868.
Taken together, I believe it fair to say that these provisions reflect a
constitutional understanding, agreed to by the original States for themselves and
all future States to be admitted on an equal (and no more advantageous)
footing, that the Indian Tribes and their remaining territory were separate
sovereignties, off limits to State intervention.
(b) This reading of the Constitution might suggest that the United States,
also, is prevented from infringing the sovereignty of the Tribes. That might
have been a desirable result. But irreversible history has foreclosed the
argument and we must find a constitutional justification for what has happened.
Although (as the Supreme Court noted in Kagama45) the words are not
entirely apt, the answer, I think, lies in the Indian Commerce Clause. We know
that the present Clause is "shorthand," unduly contracted by the Committee on
Style from Madison's wordier provision, which was, in turn, revising a more
explicit provision in the Articles of Confederation. That document recognized
federal power, not merely to "regulate trade," but also to "manage all affairs
with the Indians." Even this is ambiguous. Yet, it comes close to asserting
that, vis-h-vis the United States, the Tribes were deemed dependent and subject
to regulation. At all events, we have the evidence of very early Congresses that
the Indian Commerce Clause was believed to authorize the imposition of
federal criminal law within Indian country - which sufficiently indicates that
the Tribes were not deemed fully sovereign in respect of the United States.
45. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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And, according to McIntosh,.' it was always understood that legal title to
tribal land belonged to the United States - which placed the Tribes in a
position of vassalage vis-4-vis the national sovereign.
We may well doubt whether those who wrote the Constitution ever
contemplated federal power unilaterally to dismember Reservations, to transfer
jurisdiction to the States, and to "terminate" Tribes altogether. But we must
accept that they did. However anomalous it may seem, it is essential to avoid
suggesting that the constitutionally protected sovereignty of Tribes vis-h-vis the
States is a like bar to congressional action. Else, the Court must reject the
argument altogether.
(c) I also believe there is a constitutional basis for the special rule - not
accounted for by recognition that Indian Tribes are "sovereign" within their
Reservations - to the effect that, in some circumstances at least, non-Indians
trading with Indians in Indian country are exempted from regulation and
taxation by their State. This requires a finding that Tribes are under the special
protection of the United States. I believe such a rule can be derived from the
Indian Commerce Clause. That Clause, of its own force, arguably precludes
State interference with white-Indian intercourse, until and unless Congress
otherwise provides.
To be sure, this is not obvious on the face of the constitutional text. But it
is familiar history that the Indian Commerce Clause was intended to eliminate
the divided authority between the Nation and the States which was apparently
condoned by the Articles of Confederation in respect of white-Indian relations.
This is reflected in the debates of the Constitutional Convention and in The
Federalist; more important, it has been noted by the Court in Worcester,47 and
as late in 1876 in Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey!' The upshot is that
regulation of the intercourse with the Indian Tribes is, by the Constitution,
committed to the United Sthtes exclusively. The State can intervene only by
leave of federal authority, and it bears the burden of showing such permission.
In short, instead of looking for preemptive legislation (as in Warren Trading
Post), vie should be noting the absence of statutes delegating authority to the
State.
Counsel for the Tribes advanced such an argument in Colville, and I have
put it forward, alternatively, in Central Machinery. We must wait and see
what, if anything, the Court says when those decisions come down.
I must add that this invocation of the Indian Commerce Clause directly
reaches only white-Indian intercourse. It is not obvious that it can be extended
to oust State jurisdiction over non-Indian permanent residents of a Reservation
who are not engaged in any dealings with Indians. I very much doubt it -
especially since the Allotment Acts and the other "opening" legislation can be
46. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
47. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).




read as permitting State regulation and taxation to overstep Reservation
boundaries with respect to these "colonists" who were "invited in" by Congress.
VII
To what extent the Court will accept any of these propositions is, at the
moment, conjectural. But, it is not impossible to list factors that may increase
the prospects of a favorable reception for any expansion of tribal rights, or, at
the least, avoid the risk of an erosion of victories already won. I suggest the
following catalog of considerations which are likely to influence the Court in
the direction of preserving or consolidating tribal prerogatives.
- The extent to which the Tribe has revitalized its own institutions and is
actually exercising governmental powers - without exaggerated pretensions.
- The avoidance of obvious discrimination or arbitrariness in tribal
ordinances or the exercise of governmental functions.
- The fact that activities for which exemption from State regulation or
taxation are claimed is conducted by, or at least controlled by, the Tribe for the
common benefit, and not by a privileged few individuals for private profit.
- The degree to which the land of the territory involved is held by Indians,
preferably in tribal ownership, or is in the process of being consolidated to
reduce non-Indian ownership.
- The demonstrated willingness of Tribes, without relinquishing their
reasonable jurisdictional claims, to enter into practical "working arrangements"
with State authorities.
Accordingly, my advice to tribal leaders is to make every effort to
consolidate the land base - not by expansion into new areas, but by eliminating
the checkerboard pattern, so far as possible; and, in the meanwhile, to avoid
excessive claims in the exercise of governmental powers, especially, blatant
discrimination against non-voting residents, and to negotiate, where possible,
a modus vivendi with willing State officials. To the lawyers, I say: win your
cases in the lower courts, if you can; if your cases reach the Supreme Court,
stress present realities and future problems, not past glories or ancient wrongs;
and above all, avoid extreme arguments; don't frighten the Court with the
specter of another constitutional crisis like that engendered by the Cherokee
cases of 150 years ago. It is said that William Wirt brought tears to the eyes
of Chief Justice Marshall in the Worcester case. But remember that, although
the missionaries were ultimately released, the Cherokees lost their land. Their
lawyer won a battle and the Tribe lost the war. Let us all learn from the cruel
fate of the Cherokees.
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